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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUKANE CORPORATION, 
VS. 
BONNIE BIRCH, 
PLAINTIFF/ RESPONDENT 
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT, 
CASE NO: 870015 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues in this case are as fallows: 
1. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in 
denying appellant's motions to set aside £he default judgment ? 
2. Whether it was an error to enter a default judgment 
without considering the merits of the case and due process 
safeguards ? 
3. Whether the " Scheduling Order and Trial Notice ff 
as used by the District Court to enter a default is proper in 
terms of its draft and in the face of due process requirements ? 
4. Whether the lower courts shou|Ld consider certain 
guidelines or consider certain elements of substantive and 
procedural law in entering and finalizing dafault judgments ? 
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' STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Bonnie Birch, appeals from the Order 
of the Third District Court denying her motions to set aside 
a default judgmetn in the sum of $ 200,000.00 becuase she failed 
to appear at the time of pre-trial conference.The suit was 
commenced against three defendants based on a surety agreement 
for services and goods received by the other two defendants, 
Jack W.Cranney and Cranney Productions Ltd. Defendants Jack W. 
Cranney and Cranney Productions Ltd., filed their asnwers 
admitting the surety agreement and receipts of services and goods 
while defendant Bonnie Birch who is now divorced from defendant 
Jack W.Cranney filed an answer denying signing the surety agree-
ment and receiving any goods and services based on said surety 
agreement.Appellant contended that her signatures were forged 
by her then estrnaged husband. Appellant also went through the 
deposition but failed to appear at the pre-trial conference as 
she claimed that she did not receive any notices.In the course 
of proceedings her attorney withdrew as she could not afford him. 
The first notice of pre-trial conference was mailed to him. 
Her answer was stricken by the court at the time of pre-trial 
conference on May 5,1987 and a judgment was entered against her 
on May 13,1987. A motion to set aside the default judgment was 
filed on October 5, 1986, pursuant to the provisions of the 
Ruies 60(b) and 55 Cc) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Said 
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motions were denied as the court ruled tlkem untimely. A notice 
of appeal was filed properly on the 30th day of December 1986. 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
IN THE COURT BELOW 
1. Respondent, Plaintiff below, filed an action on 
May 13,1985 to recover for the goods and services rendered to 
the defendants based on a guaranty deed yhich limited the claim 
of the plaintiff to a total of $ 200,000,(Record Index No:26 &27). 
2. Proper Answers were filed by the defendants. 
3. Defendants Jack W.Cranney ancj his business entity 
known as Cranney Productions Ltd. admitted the validity of the 
guaranty deed and the receipt of goods arid services. 
4. Appellant, defendant below, alt that time known as 
Bonnie B.Cranney, denied signing the guaranty or receiving 
any goods or services. 
5.Appellant was represented by Klay M.Lewis Esq., 
who withdrew later as she could not affiord a counsel. 
6. A partial summary judgment wa|s entered against 
the Cranney Production Ltd., on December (27,1985 in the sum 
of $ 282,056.42. 
7. A default judgment was entereid against appellant 
in the sum of $ 200,000.00 on May 5, 1986,, as she failed to 
appear at the pe-trial conference. [RI:54|] 
8. A series of motions to set aslide the default 
judgment was commenced by the-.appellant starting the first one 
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on October 5,1986 and the .last one being denied on the 16th 
day of December 1986, thus foiiowed by a timely Notice of Appeal 
on the 30th day of December 1986. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are submitted : 
l.The Complaint filed by the plaintiff below did not 
allege that appellant has received any goods and services from 
the plaintiff.[RI:2-3] 
2.Appellant denied signing of the guaranty document 
in her Answer [RI:8-9A] and acknowledged in the Memorandum 
of Stephen B.Mitchell Esq., attorney for respondent, in 
support of his Motion for a partial summary judgment against 
Cranney Productions Ltd. [RI:21j 
3. Defendant Jack W.Cranney, ex-husband of the appellant 
signed the guaranty, papers [RI: 26-27 J on the 29th day of March 
1984, and the same dav visited the offices of his then legal 
counsel, Carman Kipp to file for a divorce from the appellant 
and issues a chek to Mr.Kipp, a copy of which is attached here-
with made part hereof as Exhibit: A. 
4. Handwriting expert, John D.Moves, finds that the 
signatures of appellant,Bonnie B.Cranney, with a high degree 
of probability may have been produced by the writer of the 
other signatures. [RI-.99J The original Guaranty document is in 
the possession.of respondent who,has refused its availability to 
Mr.Moves or any other handwriting expert. 
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5. Affidavit of Donna W.Hagio states that 
Jack W.Cranney, as a routine signed papers on behalf,of his 
then wife • ( the appellant ).. Affiant was an 
employee of Jack W.Cranney and was still working on the 29th 
dav of March 1984. 
6. That after a full trial on the divorce matter 
of Jack and Bonnie Cranney the Honorable Judith M.Billings 
ruled as part of the Divorce Decree that Jack W.Cranney, 
a defendant below, was obligated to pay the Dukane (Respondnet 
herein) obligation. [Record Index No: 69 [I 
7. That the Guaranty [RI:26] which is the basis 
of this action limits its claim to a sum of $ 200,000. and 
the Complaint filed by the respondent does not allege or 
claim that the defendants are liable separately for said 
sum but the lower Court has awarded three different judg-
ments in the sums as follows : 
I. Partial summary judgment against Cranney Productions 
dated: 12.27.85 in the sum of $ 282,056.42 [RI:45-46] 
II. Default Judgment against the appellant 
dated: 5.13.87. in the sum of $ 200,000.00 [RI:58-59] 
III.Summary Judgmment against defendant Jack W.Cranney 
dated: 4.15.87 in the sum of $200,000.00. 
(No Record Index, since Request for Transcript filed prior 
to the entry and signing of this judgment) 
8. The Court records show that the Certificate 
of Readiness for Trial and the Original Order for Scheduling 
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Conference were mailed to the former legal counsel,Kay M.Lewis 
Esq., of appellant [Record Index NO-.43 & 48] and she therefore, 
was not expecting anything until informed , being pro se. 
9.Appellant had denied receving any notices from the 
court concerning any pre-trial conference and she has also 
denied in her affidavit of knowing the nature of the proceedings 
especially caught in her divorce matter as well [RI-.62-72] 
10. Appellant has also shown that she did not recieve 
some of her mail as it was sent back or forwarded to her ex-
husband who has put a change of address. [RI.62-72 & 100 J 
11. That until a divorce between the defendants Jack 
and Bonnie Cranney their last names were the same as: Cranney. 
12. That the Scheduling Order and Trial Notice does not 
provide for a default iudgment since its contents do not spell 
out that a default judgment shall be entered in case a party 
fails to respond or snow up pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
4(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[RI:56] 
13. That the lower Court has not only stricken the 
pleadings of appellant but also entered a default iudgment 
simultaneously even though neither the caption nor the« 
contents of the "Scheduling Order And Trial Notice M provide 
for such a penalty as a default judgment. [RI:56 & 57] 
14. That at the time of entering the default the 
lower court had the notice that appellant was taking care of 
her legal matters pro se [ RI: 50] 
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15. That appellant not knowing the legal 
process did call several times the offic|es of Stephen B. 
Mitchell Esq., attorney for respondent ajnd did write a 
letter to Mr.Mitchell to take care of the default judgment. 
A copy of said letter is attached herewith and made part 
hereof as Exhibit: B. 
16. That appellant though not knowing the 
3 month time limit to set aside the default still acted 
dutifully and diligently to resolve this matter as she 
wrote a letter to Mr.Mitchell and respondent on July 10, 
1986, when her phone calls were not returned.Exhibit:B 
17. That a default judgment against her was 
entered on May 13,1986. [RI:58.|. 
18. That appellant was alsq available for 
her deposition on October 28,1985 at the request of 
respondent's attorney. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court abused its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion to set aside the default judgment 
in that it failed to consider and ponder the factors.purposes, 
and guidelines set bv the Rules and the higher court decisions: 
as outlined in eacn point of argument -specially ignoring lack of 
notice in the face of due process requirements. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IN 
EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING OR DENYING A MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULES 55(c) AND 60(b): 
1.Whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; 
2.Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; 
3.Whether the default was the result of the 
defendant's culpable conduct. 
United States v. $55518.05 in U.S.Currency 728 F.2d.192 (1984) 
The threshold question in this case is whether appellant has 
established a meritorious defense.Defendant in this case has 
not merely stated denials as defense but has actually shown more 
in another matter ( D84-1130) that she did not sign the 
guaranty which is the basis of the respondent's action. 
Statements of other witnesses in the Statement of Facts 
clearly prove that there is a good evidence for her defense 
which is more than mere denials. The showing of a meritorious 
defense is accomplished when allegations of defendant's 
answer, if established on trial, would contitute a complete 
defense to the action. Tozer v.Charles A.Krause Milling Co., 
189 F2d. at 244., Gross v. Stereo Component, systems,Inc.700 
F.2d. at 123. 
Second question is that of prejudicial harm to 
plaintiff if the case is reopened. In this case plaintiff 
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has made no claim or showing that it would be prejudiced from 
reopening.The court should have weighed tphe other two factors 
and set aside the default judgment in thi light of the boave 
cases and United Coin Meter Co. v.Seaboard C.R. 705 f.2d.839 
(1983). 
Thirdly, the element of cuipabie misconduct should 
have been weighed properly e.g. in this qase defendant has 
not only properly filed the answer but aJJso cooperated in 
other proceedings such as her deposition and her phone calls 
and letters to respondent's attorney to ilnqure about the 
matter.In fact her letter after the judgment to respondent's 
attorney after several calls on July 10, l|98b, shows her concern 
over her legal matters. Appellant was handling her divorce 
trial and this matter pro se with two opposing lawyers who 
only exchanged comments and information to their advantage 
as she has alleged in her affidavit instead of properly returning 
her calls. What else amounts to sex bias f? The poor person 
paid so much attention to these lagai matters that she was 
frantically filing all sorts of papers an$ the very ouik of 
such filings should have given an experienced lower court 
some idea as >to the concern she has as-^ op^ Qsed to any cuipabie 
misconduct.There *is no wilful misconduct in this case which 
would warrant a default judgment. Wilful jjiegiect is still an 
important factor in the use of discretionary sanctions. 
From Societe Internationale 357 U.S.197 (1958) to Notes of 
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Advisory Committee on Rules,28 U.S.C.A. Rule 37, at 45,47(Supp 
1974).in Tucker Realty inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d. 410 (1964) 
the Utah Supreme Court clearly indicated that any such conduct 
must be wilful in order to impose such severe sanction.The 
record on appeal in this case fails to show any such wilful 
misconduct and/or neglect as to warrant a default judgment of 
$200,000.00. Instead it shows that the lower court had notice 
of defendant's pro se scatus [Record index No: 50] Defendant 
did not know anything about a pre-trial conference and was not 
on a look out and the lower court made an error in assuming 
and expecting irrationally from her specially in the light of 
Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d.10 79, in which case the Utah 
Supreme Court in its wisdom considered the circumstances of 
a pro se party and the case by case approach to consider all 
the necessary elements of the Rules and the purposes of said 
rules. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT MADE A.SERIOUS ERROR IN USING THE 
ELEMENT OF DOUBT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT CONTRARY TO THE 
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES 55(c) and 60(b). 
"In a case of reasonable doubt such discretion is usually 
exercised in favor of granting the application so as to 
permit a determination of the .controversy upon the merits. 
In a number of instances, statutes, and codes and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide for the opening 
or vacating of default judgments, and such provisions are 
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liberally construed ". 46 Am Jur 2d. §686 page 837-838 
Please also see:Rapoport v.Sirott, 418 Pa^O/209 A.2d.421 
(1965); Scherrer v. Plaza Marina Commerci41 Corp. IbCal.App. 
3d 520, 94 Cal Rep.85 (1971);Southai v. Seaboard 39 Fla.Supp.124; 
GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries 3|51 NE 2d. 113; and 
Cunningham v.White 390 So. 2d. 467 (1980) ., 
It was an error to.enter a defaul|t judgment specially 
in such a large sum as $200,000.00 becausel invoking such a 
drastic sanction is proper only in the CLEAREST OF CASES 
otherwise it just becomes a game instead o|f litigation based 
on merits and the spirit of justice as embodied in the 
rules and above-mentioned cases. It should |be noted that the 
defendant had no pattern of any defiance tp the Court orders. 
fr
 When it appears that such relief is necessary to prevent 
manifest injustice to the party seeking ±Z\, that the granting 
of such relief will not place the adverse if>arty at any 
disadvantage.." Brast v.Winding Gulf, 94 F;2d. 179; 161 A 
ALR pages 1161-1202; Emerick v.Duncan Co. 146 F.688. 
The Second Circuit in Gili v.Sto^ow, 240 F.2d.669 
(1957) stated : 
In final analysis, a court has the responsibiity 
to do justice between man and man; and general principles cannot 
justify denial of a party's fair day in coutft except upon 
a serious showing of wilful default. Ld at 670. 
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In this case there is no such showing of a wilful 
default and the lower court's ruling based on three month 
time limit is simply technical and without regard to human 
circumstances and to the philosophy of case by case approach 
to achieve the ends of justice in all fairness.In fact reason-
able time limitations under FR Civ Procedure 60(b) rests within 
sound discretion of trial court and absent abuse, it brings to 
bear more liberal attitudes where no intervening rights nave 
been atfected by passage of time between judgment and motion. 
Nowicki v.United States, 536 F. 2d. 1171. 
In this case appellant just did not know the 
procedure otherwise she did act timely to correct the situation 
as she wrote a letter to the respondent and its attorney on 
July 10, 1988, which is within the three month time limits. 
Further she filed the motions to set aside the default without 
wasting any time as soon as she came to know the. >f acts. 
POINT III. 
A NOTICE SHOULD GIVE THE NECESSARY INFORMATION 
AND MUST APPRISE. THE PERSON WHOSE RIGHTS ARE TO BE AFFECTED OF 
WHAT IS REQUIRED OF HIM A NOTICE MUST BE CLEAR 
DEFINITE AND EXPLICIT, AND NOT AMBIGIOUS. THE NOTICE IS NOT 
CLEAR UNLESS ITS MEANING CAN BE APPREHENDED WITHOUT EXPLANATION 
OR ARGUMENT". 66. CJS-§.16. Notice pages: 653-654. 
In this case appellant states that she never 
received the notice for pre-trial conference due to achange 
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of address made by her ex-husband.She further claimed that 
he has been removing the mail without her knowledge.But if 
the Court were to differ it should be note|d that the pre-trial 
conference notice [Record Index NO: 54] doles not specifically 
states that a default shall be entered in lease of failure to 
appear . It should clearly state the penality as required for 
summons under Rule 4(c) because ff Notice tp a person has Deen 
held to be binding on him only in the particular transaction in 
which it is given and will not affect him In a subsequent 
and independent matter". 66 CJS §19 Notice Page:669. 
In this case it should be noted that it is oniv an " assumption" 
that striking the pleadings means a default but it does not 
convey any actual notice as required under the requirments 
of due process clause. Is it fair in the first place to assume, 
and secondly to assume that lay persons would or should know 
the meanings of legal terms and then even know the follow 
up procedure of such terms or actions ? 
CONCLUSION 
That the lower court has made errors in ignoring the 
rules and the cases and guidelines to exerdise its discretion 
under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), therefore the Idefault judgment 
entered in this matter be set aside and the| ruling of the lower 
court be reversed so that the matter is decided on its merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: / / 
this 10th day of June 1987. f / ////J f -\ 
IRSkAD A.AADIL 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT/ 
-13- DEFENDANT. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned hereby certify that I 
mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
Of Appellant to : 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL ESQ., 
Attorney for Respondnet/ Plaintiff 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
Attorneys at Law 
139 East South Temple 4 2001 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111. 
this 10th day of June 1987, postage prepaid. 
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July 10, 1986 
BBrbidge & Mitchell 
2001 Elks Building 
139 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84111 
Attention: Richard D. Burbidge, Esq., #fK92 
Stephen 8. Mitchell, Esq., #2273 
Dear Sirs, 
After several unsuccessful attempts to phi^ ne your office, I am 
writing this letter to urge your office %^ please settle the 
"Dukane" obligation. •
 9 • that i» a judgement on •'Bonnie Cranney". 
According to the second clause of the divorce decree it reads: 
"Liens and claims against the house that are related to the business 
shall be S3:>am*vi and paid by the plaintiff, including the Dukane 
obligation." 
I am sending Dukans Corporation a copy of the decree and will 
advise thes to put future correspondence io Mr. Jack Crauney. 
Sincerely, 
Ms. Bonnie Birch Cranney 
cc: Dukane Corporation 
